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ABSTRACT This paper addresses the question whether voluntary adoption of
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with lower earnings
management. Ball et al. (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1–3), pp. 235–270,
2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for
high quality information, but not necessarily a sufﬁcient one. In Germany, a code-law
country with low investor protection rights, a relatively large number of companies
have chosen to voluntarily adopt IFRS prior to 2005. We investigate whether German
companies that have adopted IFRS engage signiﬁcantly less in earnings management
compared to German companies reporting under German generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP), while controlling for other differences in earnings management
incentives. Our sample, consisting of German listed companies, contains 636 ﬁrm-year
observations relating to the period 1999–2001. Our results suggest that IFRS-adopters
do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies
reporting under German GAAP. These ﬁndings contribute to the current debate on
whether high quality standards are sufﬁcient and effective in countries with weak
investor protection rights. They indicate that voluntary adopters of IFRS in Germany
cannot be associated with lower earnings management.
1. Introduction
The International Accounting Standards (IAS), now renamed as International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), have been developed to harmonize
corporate accounting practice and to answer the need for high quality standards
to be adopted in the world’s major capital markets.
Ball etal.(2003)arguethatadoptinghighqualitystandards mightbea necessary
condition for high quality information, but not necessarily a sufﬁcient one. This
European Accounting Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, 155–180, 2005
Correspondence Address: Brenda Van Tendeloo, Universiteit Antwerpen, Faculty of Applied
Economics, Prinsstraat 13, B-2000 Antwerpen, Belgium. E-mail: brenda.vantendeloo@ua.ac.be
0963-8180 Print=1468-4497 Online=05=010155–26 # 2005 European Accounting Association
DOI: 10.1080/0963818042000338988




































































9paper contributes to this debate by examining whether the adoption of high quality
standardslikeIFRSisassociatedwithhighﬁnancialreportingquality.Inparticular,
wequestionwhetherIFRSaresufﬁcienttooverridemanagers’incentivestoengage
in earnings management and affect the quality of reported earnings.
Previous research provides evidence that the magnitude of earnings manage-
ment is on average higher in code-law countries with low investor protection
rights, compared to common-law countries with high investor protection rights
(Leuz et al., 2003). Hence, to assess whether ﬁrms that report under IFRS can
be associated with higher earnings quality we focus on Germany, which is a
code-law country with relatively low investor protection rights (La Porta et al.,
2000). Moreover, a relatively large number of German companies have already
voluntarily chosen to adopt IFRS prior to 2005. This allows a comparison
between companies that have adopted IFRS versus companies that report
under domestic generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
The results of our research show that IFRS do not impose a signiﬁcant
constraint on earnings management, as measured by discretionary accruals. On
the contrary, adopting IFRS seems to increase the magnitude of discretionary
accruals. Our results further suggest that companies that have adopted IFRS
engage more in earnings smoothing, although this effect is signiﬁcantly
reduced when the company has a Big 4 auditor. However, hidden reserves,
which are allowed under German GAAP to manage earnings, are not entirely
picked up by the traditional accruals measures. When hidden reserves are
taken into consideration, our results show that IFRS-adopters do not present
different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting
under German GAAP. Hence, our results indicate that adopters of IFRS cannot
be associated with lower earnings management. This ﬁnding suggests that the
adoption of high quality standards is not a sufﬁcient condition for providing
high quality information in code-law countries with low investor protection
rights.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review
the relevant literature and provide the theoretical background of the paper.
Section 3 provides an overview of the German accounting system. In Section
4, we formulate the research hypotheses. Section 5 describes the research
design. The results of the study are presented in Section 6. Finally, in Section
7, we summarize our results, discuss the implications and limitations of our
analysis and give suggestions for further research.
2. Previous Literature
2.1. Adoption of International Accounting Standards
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which was estab-
lished in 1973 and now renamed as the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB), aims to achieve uniformity in the accounting standards used by




































































9businesses and other organizations for ﬁnancial reporting around the world
(IASB website). The beneﬁts of the adoption of international accounting stan-
dards are considered to be the following. First, it should improve the ability of
investors to make informed ﬁnancial decisions and eliminate confusion arising
from different measures of ﬁnancial position and performance across countries,
thereby leading to a reduced risk for investors and a lower cost of capital for
companies. Second, it should lower costs arising from multiple reporting.
Third, it should encourage international investment. Finally, it should lead to a
more efﬁcient allocation of savings worldwide (Street et al., 1999).
The original International Accounting Standards were mostly descriptive in
nature and contained many alternative treatments. Because of this ﬂexibility and
a continuing lack of comparability across countries, the standards came under
heavy criticism in the late 1980s. In response to this criticism, the IASC started
the Comparability Project in 1987. The revised standards, which became effective
in 1995, substantially reduced the alternative treatments and increased the disclos-
ure requirements (Nobes, 2002). In July 1995, the IASC and the International
Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) agreed to a list of accounting
issues that needed to be addressed for obtaining IOSCO’s endorsement of the stan-
dards. The subsequent Core Standards Project led again to substantial revisions of
IAS. In May 2000, the IASC received IOSCO’s endorsement subject to ‘reconci-
liation where necessary to address substantive outstanding issues at a national or
regional level’ (IOSCO Press Release, 17 May 2000). The Core Standards
Project has brought a wider recognition to IAS around the world. For example,
the European Parliament has issued a regulation (1606/2002/EC) requiring all
EU listed companies to prepare consolidated ﬁnancial statements based on Inter-
national Accounting Standards by 2005. In a number of countries, including
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland, companies were
already permitted to prepare consolidated ﬁnancial statements under IFRS (or
US GAAP) prior to 2005.
Since German accounting standards and disclosure practices have been criti-
cized in the investor community (Leuz and Verrechia, 2000), a relatively large
number of German ﬁrms have adopted international accounting standards such
as IFRS or US GAAP. This switch is thought to represent a substantial commit-
ment to transparent ﬁnancial reporting for the following two reasons. First, IFRS
adoption itself might effectively enhance ﬁnancial reporting quality. Second,
ﬁrms which adopt IFRS or US GAAP might do so because they have higher
incentives to report transparently, such as high ﬁnancing needs. In this case,
IFRS serves as a proxy for a credible commitment to higher quality accounting.
A study conducted by Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) with Swiss data reveals
that early adopters of IFRS ‘are larger, more internationally diversiﬁed, less
capital intensive and have a more diffuse ownership’. They argue that the
decision to apply IFRS is primarily inﬂuenced by political costs and pressures
from outside markets. Murphy (1999) also used Swiss data to study the determi-
nants of the adoption of IFRS. She found that companies that adopt IFRS have a




































































9higher percentage of foreign sales and a higher number of foreign exchange list-
ings. El-Gazzar et al. (1999) found the same relationships using data from
various countries. In addition, they concluded that being domiciled in an EU
country and having a lower debt to equity ratio is positively associated with the
adoption of IFRS. Other determinants of the adoption of international standards
mentioned in the literature include a high proﬁtability, the issuance of equity
during the year of adoption, domestic GAAP differing signiﬁcantly from IFRS
or US GAAP and, related to the latter, being domiciled in a country with a
bank-oriented ﬁnancial system (Ashbaugh, 2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2003).
Not all companies that seek the international investment status that comes with
the adoption of IFRS are, however, willing to fulﬁll all of the requirements and
obligations involved. According to a study by Street and Gray (2002) there is a
signiﬁcant non-compliance with IFRS in 1998 company reports, especially in
the case of IFRS disclosure requirements. With the revision of IAS 1, effective
for ﬁnancial statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 1998, ﬁnan-
cial statements are prohibited from noting compliance with International
Accounting Standards ‘unless they comply with all the requirements of each
applicable Standard and each applicable Interpretation of the Standing Interpreta-
tions Committee’.
All companies included in our IFRS sample mention IFRS compliance in their
ﬁnancial statements after the revised IAS 1 became effective. Nevertheless, adop-
ters of IFRS that appear to be fully compliant might as well be falsely signaling to
be of high quality. Ball et al. (2000) argue that ﬁrms’ incentives to comply with
accounting standards depend on the penalties assessed for non-compliance.
When costs of complying to IFRS are viewed to exceed the costs of non-
compliance, substantial non-compliance will continue to be a problem. While
the main objective of adopting IFRS is considered to be enhancing the quality
of the information provided in the ﬁnancial statements, Ball et al. (2003)
further suggest that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary con-
dition for high quality information but not a sufﬁcient condition. If the adoption
of IFRS cannot be associated with signiﬁcantly higher ﬁnancial reporting quality,
IFRS adoption cannot serve as a signaling instrument for a credible commitment
to higher quality accounting. This study addresses this issue empirically.
2.2. Earnings Management: Incentives and Constraints
One way of assessing the quality of reported earnings is examining to what extent
earnings are managed, with the intention to ‘either mislead some stakeholders
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to inﬂuence
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers’ (Healy and
Wahlen, 1999). Incentives for earnings management, either through accounting
decisions or structuring transactions, are ample. Managers may be inclined to
manage earnings due to the existence of explicit and implicit contracts, the




































































9ﬁrm’s relation with capital markets, the need for external ﬁnancing, the political
and regulatory environment or several other speciﬁc circumstances (Vander
Bauwhede, 2001).
A number of studies suggest that the quality of reported ﬁnancial statement
information is in large part determined by the underlying economic and insti-
tutional factors inﬂuencing managers’ and auditors’ incentives. According to
Ball et al. (2000) the demand for accounting income differs systematically
between common-law and code-law countries. In common-law countries, which
are characterized by arm’s length debt and equity markets, a diverse base of inves-
tors,highriskoflitigationandstronginvestor protection,accountinginformationis
designed to meet the needs of investors. In code-law countries, capital markets are
lessactive.Investorprotectionisweak,litigationrates are lowerandcompanies are
more ﬁnanced by banks, other ﬁnancial institutions and the government, which
results in less need for public disclosure. Accounting information is therefore
designed more to meet other demands, including reduction in political costs and
determination of income tax and dividend payments (Ball et al., 2000; La Porta
et al., 2000). Leuz et al. (2003) show that earnings management is more prevalent
in code-law countries compared to common-law countries. The beneﬁts (e.g.
enhanced liquidity) of engaging in earnings management appear to outweigh the
costs (e.g. litigation) more in countries with weak investor protection rights.
Firms which adopt IFRS, however, can be expected to have incentives to report
investor-oriented information and thus engage signiﬁcantly less in earnings man-
agement than non-adopters. On the other hand, low enforcement and low litigation
risk might encourage low quality ﬁrms to falsely signal to be of high quality by
adopting IFRS. This study addresses the question whether adoption of IFRS is
associated with lower earnings management in Germany, which La Porta et al.
(2000) classify as a country with low investor protection rights.
Accounting rules can limit a manager’s ability to distort reported earnings. But
the extent to which accounting rules inﬂuence reported earnings and curb
earnings management depends on how well these rules are enforced (Leuz
et al., 2003). Apart from clear accounting standards, strong investor and creditor
protection requires a statutory audit, monitoring by supervisors and effective
sanctions (FEE, 2002).
A number of studies have shown that Big 4
1 auditors constitute a constraint on
earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991, 1994; Becker et al., 1998;
Francis et al., 1999; Gore et al., 2001). However, the results of Maijoor and
Vanstraelen (2002) and Francis and Wang (2003) document that the constraint
constituted by a Big 4 auditor on earnings management is not uniform across
countries. Street and Gray (2002) ﬁnd support for the fact that being audited
by a large audit ﬁrm is also positively associated with IFRS compliance, both
in the case of disclosure requirements as in the case of measurement and presen-
tation requirements. In this respect, we question whether adoption of IFRS by a
company has a stronger effect on the quality of earnings of that company when
audited by a Big 4 audit ﬁrm.




































































9Firms with a foreign exchange listing are presumed to have greater incentives
to report transparently because they are subject to restrictions imposed by differ-
ent countries and are exposed to a higher litigation risk. Therefore, it can be
expected that earnings quality is enhanced when listed on an international
capital market (Ball et al., 2000, 2003). For the same reason, compliance with
IFRS can be expected to be larger with these companies compared to companies
with only national sources of capital. The results of Street and Gray (2002)
support this. They found a positive association between a US listing and/or a
non-regional listing and compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements. In this
respect, we question whether ﬁrms in code-law countries, like Germany,
without a cross-listing on an international capital market could falsely signal to
be of high quality, making it difﬁcult for the capital market to distinguish
between high or low transparency adopters of IFRS. If so, a more effective
way of signaling high quality for ﬁrms in code-law countries would be to list
in a high-transparent common-law country, exposing themselves to common-
law penalties for low quality disclosure (Ball et al., 2000, 2003). Hence, we ques-
tion whether adoption of IFRS by a ﬁrm has a stronger effect on the quality of
earnings of that ﬁrm when cross-listed on a well-developed capital market that
is demanding in terms of information quality and transparency.
3. Overview of the German Accounting System
Germany can be classiﬁed as a code-law country with weak investor protection
rights (La Porta et al., 2000). A good overview of the German accounting
system is provided by Harris et al. (1994), Ball et al. (2000) and Macharzina
and Langer (2002). German ﬁrms have historically relied heavily on debt,
usually from a few banks. Large ownership blocks by other corporations or indi-
viduals are common, with banks often owning shares and acting as trustees for
the funds of small investors. The objectives of the German accounting system
are to preserve equity, protect creditors and facilitate the computation of
taxable income. Financial statements form the basis for tax accounts. Since
expenses are only tax deductible if they are included in the commercial accounts,
the inﬂuence of tax law largely determines accounting for individual company
ﬁnancial statements. Guenther and Young (2000) argue that in countries where
there is a conformity between ﬁnancial and tax accounting rules ‘ﬁnancial
accounting information may differ from underlying economic activities
because ﬁrms attempt to minimize taxable income’. Managers are given a
large number of options regarding inclusion and valuation of items in the
balance sheet and the opportunity to control net income. The ‘true and fair’
view concept is subordinated to compliance to individual provisions of law and
the dominant principle of valuation is prudence. As a result, German accounting
is in general rather conservative.
2 This tendency towards conservative reporting
is reinforced by law, preventing management from retaining more than half of net
income for the year, and strong labor unions, with substantial representations on




































































9the supervisory boards, strengthening their demands when reported earnings are
higher. However, while German accounting is widely presumed to be conserva-
tive because of the reduction of reported income during good years, German
managers also tend to increase reported income in bad years. German ﬁrms
can thus be expected to engage particularly in a speciﬁc form of earnings man-
agement, called earnings smoothing, to reduce the volatility of reported earnings.
Earnings smoothing is facilitated through the allowed use of hidden reserves,
which can be created by building up unjustiﬁed provisions, recognizing excessive
depreciation of assets or setting aside certain proﬁts in tax-free reserves.
3 This
way, a company can build up hidden reserves, which are then charged against
income, when proﬁts are high and release them in periods of losses or low
earnings (Haller, 1992; Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998).
As in other countries in continental Europe, more and more ﬁrms are looking
for public equity ﬁnancing. Hence, the ownership and ﬁnancing of these compa-
nies is changing and investors are becoming a more important user group of
ﬁnancial reporting in Germany. However, potential investors consider the discre-
tion in German standards, which allows ﬁrms to manage income using large
‘silent reserves’, and the inﬂuence of tax avoidance strategies as too large and
criticize the lack of detailed disclosures designed to satisfy the information
needs of investors and ﬁnancial analysts (Leuz and Verrechia, 2000).
In response to pressures from German ﬁrms wanting to comply with inter-
national accounting standards, the German Parliament and Federal Council
ratiﬁed the Law to Facilitate the Raising of Capital (KapAEG). This allows
listed companies to prepare their consolidated ﬁnancial statements in accordance
with IFRS, US GAAP or German GAAP as of April 1998.
Companies choosing to adopt IFRS need to give up the creation of hidden
reserves which makes earnings management more difﬁcult. Moreover, IFRS
require more disclosures (Ashbaugh, 1999; Leuz and Verrechia, 2000) and have
fewer accounting choices (d’Arcy, 2000) than German GAAP leading to a
reduction in information asymmetry. IFRS also appear to be closer to US GAAP
than foreign GAAP (Harris and Muller, 1999). Hence, IFRS can be expected to
enhance ﬁnancial reporting quality and thus constraint earnings management if
IFRS can be properly enforced. In addition, those companies with the highest
incentives to provide investors with transparent information will adopt IFRS to
signal high quality by committing themselves to higher disclosure requirements
and more transparent accounting. However, lack of enforcement and litigation
risk might induce some ﬁrms to falsely signal to be of high quality. In this
paper, we question whether the adoption of IFRS effectively is associated with
lower earnings management in a code-law country with weak investor protection.
4. Hypotheses Development
The main purpose of this paper is to examine whether adoption of high quality
standards is associated with high ﬁnancial reporting quality. In particular, it is




































































9questioned whether companies that have voluntarily adopted IFRS engage sig-
niﬁcantly less in earnings management compared to companies reporting under
domestic GAAP. Earnings management is measured by reported discretionary
accruals and the correlation between operating cash ﬂow and accruals. We
hypothesize, in alternative form:
Hypothesis 1: Firms which have adopted IFRS engage signiﬁcantly less in
earnings management compared to companies reporting under German
GAAP.
Financial reporting quality is dependent on both the quality of accounting stan-
dards and their implementation. Finding evidence supporting the null hypothesis
could be caused by either low quality of IFRS or low enforcement, enabling low
quality ﬁrms to falsely signal high quality.
Big 4 audit ﬁrms are assumed to provide higher audit quality than other audit
ﬁrms, meaning that they should do a better job in the enforcement of ﬁnancial
reporting. Since previous research has shown that being audited by a Big 4
audit ﬁrm imposes a constraint on earnings management and enhances
compliance with IFRS disclosure, measurement and presentation requirements,
it can also be expected that adopting high quality standards has a larger effect
on the reduction of earnings management when audited by a Big 4 ﬁrm. Big 4
audit ﬁrms are thus expected to reduce the probability that ﬁrms falsely signal
to be of high quality. Hence, we hypothesize, in alternative form:
Hypothesis 2: Adoption of IFRS has a larger effect on the reduction of
earnings management, when audited by a Big 4 audit ﬁrm compared to a
non-Big 4 audit ﬁrm.
The probability that ﬁrms falsely signal to be of high quality is also reduced when
ﬁrms rely on an international capital market. Because ﬁrms with a foreign
exchange listing are presumed to have greater incentives to report transparently,
the negative relationship between IFRS adoption and earnings management is
expected to be larger when cross-listed on a well-developed international
capital market. We consider NASDAQ, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the London Stock Exchange (LSE) as the most demanding stock
exchanges in terms of information quality and transparency. This results in the
following hypothesis, formulated in alternative form:
Hypothesis 3: Adoption of IFRS has a larger effect on the reduction of
earnings management, when cross-listed on a well-developed international
capital market: NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE.






































































Data of German companies are collected using the August 2002 version of the
Osiris database. Consistent with previous research, we exclude ﬁnancial insti-
tutions (SIC 60–67) and utility companies (SIC 40–49). Financial institutions
are excluded because of their speciﬁc accounting requirements, which differ sub-
stantially from those of industrial and commercial companies and which prevent
them from freely selecting the accounting standards they apply. Utility compa-
nies (SIC 40–49) are excluded because of the high diversity within this category,
which is a problem when estimating discretionary accruals per industry and year
(Vander Bauwhede, 2001). Our sample comprises 636 ﬁrm-year observations,
relating to the period 1999–2001. All companies in our sample are listed
ﬁrms. Firm-year observations of which (1) ﬁnancial statement data is not compli-
ant to either German GAAP or IFRS, (2) the company has adopted IFRS for the
ﬁrst time,
4 (3) data of all variables is not available, (4) ﬁrm equity is negative or
(5) total or discretionary accruals are above 100% of lagged total assets are
excluded. Because the IASB list of companies complying to IFRS is incomplete,
companies complying to either IFRS or German GAAP are identiﬁed by indivi-
dually inspecting the ﬁnancial statements of the companies included in our
sample. As mentioned, with the revision of IAS 1, all companies that refer to
the use of IFRS in their annual report, should be fully compliant since 1999.
5.2. Earnings Management Measures
5.2.1. The magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals
As a ﬁrst measure of earnings management, we use the magnitude of absolute
discretionary accruals. Since only total accruals are known, discretionary
accruals have to be estimated. Several models have been developed for this
purpose. A good overview is provided by Dechow et al. (1995), Healy and
Wahlen (1999), Young (1999) and McNichols (2000). Discretionary accruals
are deﬁned as actual total reported accruals less expected normal accruals. We
use the cross-sectional Jones model (Jones, 1991) to estimate discretionary
accruals. Speciﬁcally, discretionary accruals are estimated as the residuals of
the following regression equation:
ACCt ¼ atk0(1=At 1) þ atk1DREVt þ atk2GPPEt þ mt
where:
ACCt ¼ accruals in year t, scaled by lagged total assets, where accruals equal
the year-to-year change in non-cash current assets minus current
liabilities (excluding short-term debt and income taxes payable)
minus depreciation




































































9At21 ¼ total assets in year t 2 1 or lagged total assets
DREVt ¼ change in revenues in year t, scaled by lagged total assets
GPPEt ¼ gross property, plant and equipment in year t, scaled by lagged total
assets.
Firm-year observations with total accruals above 100% of lagged total assets
are excluded. Since we lack sufﬁcient observations to consider ﬁrm-speciﬁc coef-
ﬁcients, the regressions are performed using data from ﬁrms matched on year (t)
and industry (k) in a similar way as DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), requiring a
minimum of six observations per regression.
5 This way, SIC 01–09 (agriculture,
forestry and ﬁshing) had to be excluded. The total number of observations in our
estimation sample is 1,212. Table 1 presents the number of observations per
industry and year in the estimation sample.
Because of missing values and exclusion of ﬁrm-year observations of which
ﬁrm equity is negative or discretionary accruals are above 100% of lagged
total assets, the number of observations in our research sample is further
reduced to 636 ﬁrm-year observations, which is illustrated in Table 2.
5.2.2. The correlation between total reported accruals and operating cash ﬂow
Besides discretionary accruals, we use a secondmeasure of earnings management
by examining the correlation between accruals and operating cash ﬂow as a proxy
for earnings smoothing (see Leuz et al., 2003). A negative correlation between
accruals and operating cash ﬂow indicates the use of accruals to smooth the
variability in operating cash ﬂows. While a negative correlation between accruals
and operating cash ﬂow is inherent to accrual accounting, differences in the




The three independent variables of interest of this study are (1) whether the
company has adopted IFRS or not (IFRS), (2) whether the company is audited
by a Big 4 audit ﬁrm or not (B4NB4) and (3) whether the company has a
listing on NASDAQ, the NYSE or the LSE (UKUSLIST). To examine the
Table 1. Number of observations by industry and year in estimation sample
US SIC codes 1999 2000 2001 Total
10–17 Mining and Construction 14 16 7 37
20–39 Manufacturing 278 299 139 716
50–59 Wholesale trade 39 35 16 90
70–89 Services 139 162 68 369
Total 470 512 230 1,212




































































9effect of IFRS on the correlation between accruals and operating cash ﬂow
(OPCF), we include the interaction variable ‘IFRS   OPCF’. To test whether
having a Big 4 auditor or a cross-listing on a well-developed capital market inﬂu-
ences the effect of IFRS on the magnitude of reported discretionary accruals, the
interaction variables ‘IFRS   B4NB4’ and ‘IFRS   UKUSLIST’ are included in
the regression analysis. To test whether increased enforcement inﬂuences the
effect of IFRS on earnings smoothing, we include ‘IFRS   OPCF   B4NB4’
and ‘IFRS   OPCF   UKUSLIST’.
To control for differences in earnings management incentives, we include the
following variables. First, we include the natural logarithm of total assets
(LNASSETS) to proxy for the size of a company, which itself is a proxy variable
for political attention (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). The political cost hypo-
thesis states that larger ﬁrms are more likely to prefer downward earnings man-
agement, because the potential for government scrutiny increases as ﬁrms are
larger and more proﬁtable (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Young, 1999). The
expected relationship between discretionary accruals and the natural logarithm
of total assets is negative. Taking the absolute value of discretionary accruals
as independent variable of our study results, however, in a negative expected
sign for positive discretionary accruals and a positive expected sign for negative
discretionary accruals.
Second, we include a leverage or gearing variable (GEARING), which can
have an impact on earnings management in two directions. The debt–equity
hypothesis predicts that highly leveraged ﬁrms are more likely to engage in
upward earnings management to avoid debt covenant violations (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1990; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Young, 1999). Alternatively,
Becker et al. (1998) report that high leverage may induce income-decreasing
earnings management in ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms in view of contractual rene-
gotiations. When taking the absolute value of discretionary accruals, a positive
sign is expected following the debt–equity hypothesis when discretionary
accruals are positive and a negative sign is expected when discretionary accruals
are negative. Following the contractual renegotiations hypothesis, the expected
signs are just the opposite of the former.
Third, (the absolute value of) operating cash ﬂow scaled by lagged total assets
(OPCF) is included as a performance measure, since the estimated discretionary
Table 2. Number of observations by industry and year in ﬁnal sample
US SIC codes 1999 2000 2001 Total
10–17 Mining and Construction 8 12 4 24
20–39 Manufacturing 173 176 72 421
50–59 Wholesale trade 24 25 11 60
70–89 Services 45 56 30 131
Total 250 269 117 636




































































9accruals are too large for ﬁrms experiencing extreme ﬁnancial performance.
Dechow et al. (1995) and Young (1999) report that the matching principle
results in a natural smoothing property of accounting accruals which causes
negative (positive) non-discretionary accruals to occur in a period with
extreme positive (negative) cash ﬂows of which a part will be incorrectly
attributed to income-decreasing (income-increasing) discretionary accruals. We
include cash ﬂow from operations to control for this potential misspeciﬁcation.
The expected relationship between operating cash ﬂow and discretionary
accruals is negative. Taking the absolute values of both these variables, results
in a positive relationship. On the other hand, Dechow et al. (1995) and McNi-
chols (2000) report that ﬁrms with abnormally high (low) earnings have positive
(negative) shocks to earnings that include an accrual component and thus, ﬁrms
with high (low) earnings tend to have high (low) cash ﬂows and high (low)
accruals. As a consequence, one is more likely to ﬁnd a positive relationship
for the most proﬁtable ﬁrms. A positive sign is thus expected on this variable
in both cases when considering absolute values.
Finally, we include industry dummies (IND) to control for industry effects on
earnings management.
Hence, our empirical models look as follows:
jDACCtj¼b0 þ b1 IFRSt þ b2 B4NB4t þ b3 UKUSLISTt
þ b4 IFRSt
  B4NB4t þ b5 IFRSt
  UKUSLISTt
þ b6jOPCFtjþb7 LNASSETSt þ b8 GEARINGt
þ b9 IND þ 11t (A)
ACCt ¼ b0 þ b1 IFRSt þ b2 B4NB4t þ b3 UKUSLISTt
þ b4 OPCFt þ b5 IFRSt





  UKUSLISTt þ b8 LNASSETSt
þ b9 GEARINGt þ b10 IND þ 12t (B)
where:
Dependent variables
jDACCtj ¼ absolute value of discretionary accruals in year t, scaled by lagged
total assets
ACCt ¼ accruals in year t, scaled by lagged total assets.
Independent variables
IFRSt ¼ dummy variable (compliance to IFRS¼1, else¼0)
B4NB4t ¼ dummy variable (company has Big 4 auditor¼1, else¼0)




































































9UKUSLISTt ¼ dummy variable (company listed on NASDAQ, NYSE or
LSE¼1, else¼0)
OPCFt ¼ operating cash ﬂow in year t, computed as operating income
minus accruals, scaled by lagged total assets
LNASSETSt ¼ natural logarithm of total assets in year t
GEARINGt ¼ ratio of long-term debt over common equity in year t
IND ¼ vector of industry dummies (SIC 10–17: Mining and
Construction; SIC 20–39: Manufacturing; SIC 50–59:
Wholesale trade).
It is noted that SIC 70–89 (Services) is the industry of reference.
5.4. Test for Endogeneity of IFRS
Following prior literature (e.g. Leuz and Verrechia, 2000), we should be con-
cerned that some (unobservable) variables that both affect earnings management
and the decision to adopt IFRS have been omitted from the analysis, making
IFRS an endogenous variable. To test whether IFRS is endogenous in our earn-
ings management (EM) model, the extended regression version of the Hausman
Speciﬁcation Test is performed (Maddala, 2001, p. 498; Wooldridge, 2003,
p. 506). In particular, we estimate a reduced form, where IFRS is explained by
all the exogenous variables of the EM model and an additional variable, that
is, the number of geographic segments a company is operating in, because of
its importance in explaining accounting standards choice as shown in previous
literature (e.g. Cuijpers and Buijink, 2003).
7 Since IFRS is a dichotomous vari-
able, a logistic regression is performed (results not reported). Formally, our
IFRS model looks as follows:
IFRSt ¼ p0 þ p1 B4NB4t þ p2 UKUSLISTt þ p3jOPCFtjþp4 LNASSETSt
þ p5 GEARINGt þ p6 IND þ p7 NOGEOSEGt þ nt
where:
NOGEOSEGt ¼ number of geographic segments the company is operating in
and the other variables as previously speciﬁed.
Including the estimated residual nt as an additional regressor in the EM model
allows us to test for the endogeneity of IFRS. If the coefﬁcient on the estimated
residual is signiﬁcantly different from 0, the model suffers from an endogeneity
bias. If this appears to be the case, we can control for the endogeneity of IFRS
by performing a Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) analysis, using the ﬁtted
probabilities of the IFRS model as the instrumental variable (Maddala, 1983).
However, the coefﬁcient on the estimated residual does not appear to be signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero (p ¼ 0.310) in our EM model, indicating that this




































































9model does not suffer from an endogeneity bias causedby omitted variables inﬂu-
encing both earnings management and the choice to adopt IFRS. Hence, Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) estimates are preferred to 2SLS estimates.
6. Results
6.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 shows that 23% of the companies in our sample adopted IFRS, 54% are
being audited by a Big 4 audit ﬁrm and 2% have a listing on NASDAQ, NYSE or
LSE. As presented in Table 4, 52% of the ﬁrms complying to domestic account-
ing standards are being audited by a Big 4 auditor, while 60% of the ﬁrms com-
plying to IFRS have a Big 4 auditor. The proportion of ﬁrms having a NASDAQ,
NYSE or LSE listing is also smaller in the non-IFRS sample (2%) compared with
the IFRS sample (3%).
The descriptive statistics of the (discretionary) accruals, operating cash ﬂows
and earnings are presented in Table 5. Income-decreasing (discretionary)
accruals seem to be reported more frequently than income-increasing (discretion-
ary) accruals. Although the magnitude of the average income-decreasing
(discretionary) accruals differs slightly from that of the income-increasing
(discretionary) accruals, the difference is not signiﬁcant.
8
6.2. Univariate Results
The univariate results on discretionary acruals,
9 as presented in Table 6, suggest
thatIFRS-adoptersreportsigniﬁcantlyhigherabsolutediscretionaryaccrualsthan
non-adopters.WhileIFRS-adoptersreportsigniﬁcantlyhigherincome-decreasing
discretionary accruals, there is no signiﬁcant difference in the reporting of
income-increasing discretionary accruals. For companies being audited by a Big
4 audit ﬁrm, IFRS adoption is not signiﬁcantly associated with different reporting
levels of discretionary accruals. When audited by a non-Big 4 audit ﬁrm, IFRS
adoption is associated with higher levels of absolute discretionary accruals and
income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Because of the small proportion of
companies with a cross-listing on NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE, the same conclu-
sions as for the total sample can be drawn for companies without such a cross-
Table 3. Percentage of observations using IFRS,
having Big 4 auditor or having NASDAQ, NYSE
or LSE listing
IFRS 23%
Big 4 auditor 54%
NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE listing 2%




































































9listing. For companies cross-listed on NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE, the adoption of
IFRS is not signiﬁcantly associated with lower discretionary accruals.
Regarding the correlation between operating cash ﬂows and accruals, Pearson
correlation coefﬁcients are presented in Table 7. While the coefﬁcients appear to
be signiﬁcantly negative for both companies reporting under German GAAP as
for companies reporting under IFRS, they appear to be slightly more negative
for companies reporting under IFRS.
Table 4. Number of observations by accounting standards, auditor and listing
Big 4 Non-Big 4 Total
Domestic accounting standards
NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE listing 8 0 8 (2%)
No NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE listing 249 233 482 (98%)
Total 257 (52%) 233 (48%) 490
IFRS
NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE listing 2 3 5 (3%)
No NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE listing 85 56 141 (97%)
Total 87 (60%) 59 (40%) 146
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of discretionary accruals, total accruals, operating cash ﬂow
and earnings
Pooled N jMeanj Median Min Max STD
jDACCj 636 0.0979 0.0600 0.0002 0.9766 0.1263
DACC , 0 341 0.0972 20.0611 20.9766 20.0002 0.1276
DACC   0 295 0.0986 0.0595 0.0002 0.8842 0.1251
Difference
t-test t ¼ 20.144
(two-tailed signiﬁcance) (0.886)
ACC 636 0.0500 20.0594 20.9609 0.8492 0.1668
ACC , 0 467 0.1140 20.0874 20.9609 20.0008 0.1137
ACC   0 169 0.1267 0.0700 0.0003 0.8492 0.1626
Difference
t-test t ¼ 20.938
(two-tailed signiﬁcance) (0.349)
OPCF 636 0.0984 0.1192 22.2683 0.8478 0.2139
Earnings 636 0.0003 0.0242 21.6697 0.7092 0.1565
Notes:
DACC ¼ discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets
ACC ¼ total accruals scaled by lagged total assets
OPCF ¼ operating cash ﬂow, computed as operating income minus accruals, scaled by lagged total
assets
Earnings ¼ net earnings or bottom-line reported income, scaled by lagged total assets.














































































Total sample jDACCj 0.0903 (490) 0.1233 (146) 22.276   (0.024)
DACC , 0 20.0866 (270) 20.1376 (71) 2.224   (0.029)
DACC   0 0.0948 (220) 0.1098 (75) 20.896 (0.371)
Big 4 jDACCj 0.0932 (257) 0.1150 (87) 21.166 (0.246)
DACC , 0 20.0960 (140) 20.1271 (42) 1.008 (0.318)
DACC   0 0.0868 (117) 0.1036 (45) 20.723 (0.471)
Non-Big 4 jDACCj 0.0871 (233) 0.1357 (59) 22.086   (0.041)
DACC , 0 20.0755 (130) 20.1628 (29) 2.180   (0.037)
DACC   0 0.1026 (103) 0.1114 (30) 20.626 (0.533)
NASDAQ,
NYSE or
jDACCj 0.0607 (8) 0.0335 (5) 1.070 (0.308)
LSE listing DACC , 0 20.0562 (6) 20.0649 (2) 0.202 (0.847)
DACC   0 0.0742 (2) 0.0125 (3) 2.564 (0.217)
No NASDAQ,
NYSE or
jDACCj 0.0908 (482) 0.1265 (141) 22.396   (0.018)
LSE listing DACC , 0 20.0898 (264) 20.1432 (69) 2.229   (0.029)
DACC   0 0.0950 (218) 0.1139 (72) 21.103 (0.271)
 ,   ,    Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the a ¼ 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
(two-tailed).
Table 7. Univariate analysis on earnings smoothing
No IFRS IFRS
Total sample Pearson correlation 20.529    20.591   
OPCF-ACC
(N) (490) (146)
Big 4 Pearson correlation 20.406    20.425   
OPCF-ACC
(N) (257) (87)
Non-Big 4 Pearson correlation 20.655    20.749   
OPCF-ACC
(N) (233) (59)
NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE listing Pearson correlation 20.762   20.883  
OPCF-ACC
(N) (8) (5)
No NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE listing Pearson correlation 20.527    20.590   
OPCF-ACC
(N) (482) (141)
 ,   ,    Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the a ¼ 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively
(two-tailed).





































































Table 8 includes Pearson correlation coefﬁcients and Variance Inﬂation Factors
(VIFs). As can be seen, the risk of bias due to strong correlations among
covariates is minimal.
6.3.1. Magnitude of the absolute value of discretionary accruals
Two regressions are performed to test our hypotheses. To test Hypothesis 1, the
regression analysis is ﬁrst performed without the interaction variables with IFRS.
The results of this regression, presented in Panel A of Table 9 (1), indicate that
companies that have adopted IFRS report signiﬁcantly more discretionary
accruals than companies reporting under German GAAP, which contradicts
Hypothesis 1. To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, the interaction variables of interest
‘IFRS   B4NB4’ and ‘IFRS   UKUSLIST’ are included in the regression analy-
sis. The results, presented in Panel A of Table 9 (2), show that increased enforce-
ment does not signiﬁcantly enhance the reduction of discretionary accruals with
IFRS adoption. Neither having a Big 4 auditor nor having a cross-listing on the
NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE appears to signiﬁcantly reduce the level of reported
discretionary accruals of companies complying to IFRS. Nor do they have a
signiﬁcant impact on the level of discretionary accruals for companies that
have not adopted IFRS.
The regression results further demonstrate that all other control variables,
except for the leverage or gearing variable, are signiﬁcant.
6.3.2. Correlation between accruals and operating cash ﬂow
In a similar way to testing our hypotheses using the magnitude of the absolute
value of discretionary accruals as a measure for earnings management, we now
examine the correlation between accruals and operating cash ﬂow as a measure
for earnings smoothing. To test Hypothesis 1, the regression analysis is ﬁrst
performed with only the interaction variable ‘IFRS   OPCF’. The outcome of
this regression is presented in Table 9, Panel B (1). The results demonstrate that
for companies reporting under IFRS the correlation between operating cash
ﬂow and accruals is signiﬁcantly negative. This ﬁnding suggests that ﬁrms report-
ing under IFRS engage signiﬁcantly more in earnings smoothing than companies
reporting under German GAAP, which is again the opposite of Hypothesis 1.
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, the interaction variables of interest ‘IFRS   OPCF
  B4NB4’ and ‘IFRS   OPCF   UKUSLIST’ are included in the regression analy-
sis. As can be seen in Table 9, Panel B (2), adopting IFRS signiﬁcantly
encourages managers to engage in earnings smoothing when the company does
not have a Big 4 auditor nor a cross-listing on the NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE.
Having a Big 4 auditor appears to reduce the increase in earnings smoothing
with the adoption of IFRS. Having a cross-listing on NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE
has a reducing impact on earnings smoothing of companies complying to
IFRS, but this relationship is not signiﬁcant.




































































9Table 8. Pearson correlation matrix and variation inﬂation factors






IFRS 0.110   1 2.591
B4NB4 0.007 0.060 1 1.391
UKUSLIST 20.054 0.053 0.066 1 1.825
OPCF 0.537   20.026 0.005 20.004 1 1.084
LNASSETS 20.215   0.045 0.266   0.350   20.163   1 1.454
GEARING 20.021 20.048 20.067 20.015 20.024 20.039 1 1.011
SIC1017 20.079  20.069  20.033 20.029 20.087  0.111   20.007 1 1.285
SIC2039 20.241   20.163   0.082  0.103   20.101  0.086  0.031 20.277   1 1.766
SIC50 20.031 20.112   20.048 20.047 20.084  0.184   0.002 20.064 20.452   1 1.643
IFRS  
B4NB4
0.054 0.729   0.367   0.007 20.038 0.137   20.030 20.055 20.093   20.097   1 2.794
IFRS  
UKUSLIST
20.045 0.163   20.025 0.616   20.001 0.196   20.010 20.018 0.064 20.029 0.068 1 1.681





































































































The following sensitivity analyses were performed to check the robustness of our
results. First, since voluntary adoption of IFRS is associated with ﬁrms that are
larger, more proﬁtable and have a lower leverage (Dumontier and Raffournier,
1998; El-Gazzar et al., 1999; Ashbaugh, 2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2003),
the control variables operating cash ﬂow (OPCF), leverage or gearing
(GEARING) and size (LNASSETS) might be picking up some of the effects of
IFRS or vice versa. Therefore, the regression using the magnitude of discretion-
ary accruals as dependent variable is also performed when including the inter-
action variables of IFRS with these control variables (results not reported).
The coefﬁcient on the interaction variable ‘IFRS   jOPCFj’ is signiﬁcantly
positive, while neither IFRS nor its other interactions have signiﬁcant coefﬁ-
cients. This could suggest that IFRS-adopters engage more in earnings smooth-
ing, which is conﬁrmed by the results in Panel B of Table 9, using the
correlation between accruals and operating cash ﬂow as earnings management
measure.
Second, discretionary accruals models, of which the Jones model is the most
commonly used, have been criticized to estimate discretionary accruals with
error (e.g. McNichols, 2000). Therefore, the regression analysis was also







Panel A: Magnitude of discretionary accruals
jDACCtj ¼ b0 þ b1 IFRSt þ b2 B4NB4t þ b3 UKUSLISTt þ b4 IFRSt
  B4NB4t
þ b5 IFRSt
  UKUSLISTt þ b6jOPCFtjþb7 LNASSETSt þ b8 GEARINGt
þ b9 IND þ 11t
Intercept 0.160 4.943    0.157 4.802   
IFRSt 0.0213 2.143   0.0327 2.110  
B4NB4t 0.0104 1.222 0.0133 1.266
UKUSLISTt 20.0076 20.244 0.0079 0.206
IFRSt
  B4NB4t 20.0157 20.796
IFRSt
  UKUSLISTt 20.0469 20.790
jOPCFtj 0.377 14.548    0.376 14.520   
LNASSETSt 20.0074 22.712    20.0074 22.669   
GEARINGt 20.0000 20.032 20.0000 0.002
SIC 10–17 20.0578 22.399   20.0573 22.378  
SIC 20–39 20.0613 25.408    20.0610 25.358   
SIC 50–59 20.0306 21.727  20.003 21.707 
(continued)













































































2 (adjusted) 0.347 0.347
F 38.546    31.612   
Panel B: Earnings smoothing
ACCt ¼ b0 þ b1 IFRSt þ b2 B4NB4t þ b3 UKUSLISTt þ b4 OPCFt
þ b5 IFRSt





  UKUSLISTt þ b8 LNASSETSt
þ b9 GEARINGt þ b10 IND þ 13t
Intercept 20.142 23.401    20.132 23.193   
IFRSt 0.0231 1.616 0.0184 1.280
B4NB4t 20.0192 21.687  20.0220 21.935 
UKUSLISTt 20.0399 20.953 20.0458 20.931
OPCFt 20.405 213.419    20.402 213.416   
IFRSt
  OPCFt 20.241 24.052    20.407 25.163   
IFRSt
  OPCFt
  B4NB4t 0.322 3.173   
IFRSt
  OPCFt
  UKUSLISTt 0.211 0.504
LNASSETSt 0.0070 1.918  0.0067 1.826 
GEARINGt 20.0003 20.565 20.0003 20.582
SIC 10–17 0.0770 2.423   0.0721 2.279  
SIC 20–39 0.0701 4.593    0.0665 4.366   
SIC 50–59 0.0537 2.289   0.0496 2.123  
N 636 636
R
2 (adjusted) 0.333 0.341
F 32.647    28.405   
Notes:
 ,   ,    Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the a ¼ 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively (two-
tailed).
jDACCtj ¼ absolute value of discretionary accruals in year t, scaled by lagged total assets, where dis-
cretionary accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional Jones model and accruals equal the year-to-
year change in non-cash current assets minus current liabilities (excluding short-term debt and income
taxes payable) minus depreciation
ACCt ¼ reported accruals in year t, scaled by lagged total assets, where accruals equal the year-to-
year change in non-cash current assets minus current liabilities (excluding short-term debt and
income taxes payable) minus depreciation
IFRSt ¼ dummy variable (compliance to IFRS ¼ 1, else ¼ 0)
B4NB4t ¼ dummy variable (company has Big 4 auditor ¼ 1, else ¼ 0)
UKUSLISTt ¼ dummy variable (company listed on NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE ¼ 1, else ¼ 0)
OPCFt ¼ operating cash ﬂow in year t scaled by lagged total assets
LNASSETSt ¼ natural logarithm of total assets in year t
GEARINGt ¼ ratio of long-term debt over common equity in year t
IND ¼ vector of industry dummies (SIC 10–17: Mining and Construction; SIC 20–39: Manufactur-
ing; SIC 50–59: Wholesale trade).




































































9performed using total accruals instead of discretionary accruals (results not




GAAP to manage earnings, are not entirely picked up by these accruals. There-




revenues and other long-term non-interest bearing debt in addition to the working
capital accruals and depreciation. The outcome of the regressions using this
alternative measure is presented in Table 10. The results indicate that IFRS do
not have a signiﬁcant impact on the magnitude of these alternative discretionary
accruals (Table 10, Panel A), nor on their correlation with operating cash ﬂows
(Table 10, Panel B). Given that the use of hidden reserves is forbidden by
IFRS, IFRS-adopters appear to turn more to the use of (discretionary) accruals
to manage and more speciﬁcally smooth their earnings. When including these
hidden reserves in the accruals, there appears to be no signiﬁcant difference in
the magnitude of reported discretionary accruals or earnings smoothing behavior
of IFRS-adopters, compared to companies reporting under German GAAP.
Hence, adopters of IFRS cannot be associated with lower earnings management.







Panel A: Magnitude of discretionary accruals
jADACCtj ¼ b0 þ b1 IFRSt þ b2 B4NB4t þ b3 UKUSLISTt þ b4 IFRSt
  B4NB4t
þ b5 IFRSt
  UKUSLISTt þ b6jOPCFtjþb7 LNASSETSt
þ b8 GEARINGt þ b9 IND þ 11t
Intercept 0.169 5.060    0.164 4.855   
IFRSt 0.0012 0.114 0.0172 1.078
B4NB4t 0.0063 0.719 0.0118 1.186
UKUSLISTt 20.0068 20.211 20.0007 20.017
IFRSt
  B4NB4t 20.0263 21.292
IFRSt
  UKUSLISTt 20.0270 20.440
jOPCFtj 0.324 12.103    0.323 12.066   
LNASSETSt 20.0057 22.021   20.0055 21.937 
GEARINGt 20.0002 20.411 20.0002 0.466
SIC 10–17 20.0744 22.991    20.0745 22.992   
SIC 20–39 20.0776 26.621    20.0777 26.604   
SIC 50–59 20.553 23.018    20.0556 23.032   
(continued)













































































2 (adjusted) 0.296 0.296
F 30.641    25.231   
Panel B: Earnings smoothing
AACCt ¼ b0 þ b1 IFRSt þ b2 B4NB4t þ b3 UKUSLISTt þ b4 OPCFt
þ b5 IFRSt





  UKUSLISTt þ b8 LNASSETSt
þ b9 GEARINGt þ b10 IND þ 13t
Intercept 20.0985 22.227   20.0964 22.170  
IFRSt 0.0135 0.885 0.0110 0.713
B4NB4t 20.0227 21.872  20.0230 21.884 
UKUSLISTt 20.0017 20.040 20.0184 20.348
OPCFt 20.359 211.186    20.358 211.135   
IFRSt
  OPCFt 20.0738 21.168 20.127 21.499
IFRSt
  OPCFt
  B4NB4t 0.0962 0.886
IFRSt
  OPCFt
  UKUSLISTt 0.291 0.648
LNASSETSt 0.0025 0.639 0.0025 0.628
GEARINGt 20.0001 20.193 20.0001 20.196
SIC 10–17 0.102 3.022    0.1 2.954   
SIC 20–39 0.0803 4.948    0.0788 4.832   
SIC 50–59 0.0793 3.181    0.0775 3.098   
N 636 636
R
2 (adjusted) 0.222 0.221
F 19.089    15.979   
Notes:
 ,   ,    Signiﬁcantlydifferentfromzeroatthea ¼ 0.10,0.05and0.01level,respectively(two-tailed).
jADACCtj ¼ absolute value of alternative discretionary accruals in year t, scaled by lagged total
assets, where alternative discretionary accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional Jones model
and alternative accruals equal the year-to-year change in non-cash current assets minus current liabil-
ities (excluding short-term debt and income taxes payable) minus depreciation plus the year-to-year
change in provisions, deferred revenues and other long-term non-interest bearing debt
AACCt ¼ alternative accruals in year t, scaled by lagged total assets, where alternative accruals equal
the year-to-year change in non-cash current assets minus current liabilities (excluding short-term debt
and income taxes payable) minus depreciation plus the year-to-year change in provisions, deferred
revenues and other long-term non-interest bearing debt
IFRSt ¼ dummy variable (compliance to IFRS ¼ 1, else ¼ 0)
B4NB4t ¼ dummy variable (company has Big 4 auditor ¼ 1, else ¼ 0)
UKUSLISTt ¼ dummy variable (company listed on NASDAQ, NYSE or LSE ¼ 1, else ¼ 0)
OPCFt ¼ operating cash ﬂow in year t scaled by lagged total assets
LNASSETSt ¼ natural logarithm of total assets in year t
GEARINGt ¼ ratio of long-term debt over common equity in year t
IND ¼ vector of industry dummies (SIC 10–17: Mining and Construction; SIC 20–39: Manufactur-
ing; SIC 50–59: Wholesale trade).





































































The purpose of this study was to examine whether adoption of IFRS is
associated with lower earnings management. Ball et al. (2003) argue that adopt-
ing high quality standards might be a necessary condition for acquiring
high quality information, but not necessarily a sufﬁcient one. Our study is
based on a sample of German companies. In Germany, a code-law country
with low investor protection rights, a relatively large number of companies
have chosen to voluntarily adopt IFRS prior to 2005. We investigate whether
German companies that have adopted IFRS engage signiﬁcantly less in earnings
management compared to German companies reporting under domestic GAAP,
while controlling for other differences in earnings management incentives and
enforcement mechanisms.
The results of our study suggest that without the possibility of using hidden
reserves to manage earnings, IFRS-adopters turn more to discretionary accruals
to manage their earnings. Moreover, it appears that companies that have adopted
IFRS engage more in earnings smoothing, but this increase in earnings smoothing
with the adoption of IFRS is signiﬁcantly reduced when the company has a Big 4
auditor. However, when hidden reserves are taken into consideration, IFRS-
adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to
companies reporting under German GAAP.
These ﬁndings contribute to the current debate on whether high quality stan-
dards are sufﬁcient and effective in countries with weak investor protection
rights. They indicate that in general, adopters of IFRS cannot be associated
with lower earnings management. In this regard, the German New Market
11 or
the high-tech and innovative segment of the Deutsche Bo ¨rse, which was closed
after the surfacing of several corporate scandals and an overall slump in high-
tech stocks, provides an interesting example.
The results of this study are subject to the following limitations. First, although
we have controlled for various earnings management incentives, it is acknowl-
edged that there may be other incentives to manage earnings that have not
been controlled for. Second, although we have largely succeeded in controlling
for the allowed use of hidden reserves to manage earnings, we were unable to
identify all of these hidden reserves. Finally, we only consider one aspect of earn-
ings quality: the level of earnings management. Further research could beneﬁt
from examining the relationship between IFRS adoption and other aspects of
earning quality, such as timeliness, earnings conservatism and value relevance.
In addition, further research effort is warranted to distinguish between high
and low transparency adopters of IFRS.
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Notes
1For convenience we use the term Big 4 auditor to identify the large international audit ﬁrm net-
works. Some of the studies we refer to were conducted before the mergers resulted into a
reduction to four international audit networks.
2Conservatism is here referred to as pervasive conservatism or balance sheet conservatism and
has to be distinguished from earnings conservatism or asymmetric timeliness. Pervasive
conservatism refers to a consistent understatement of equity. Earnings conservatism refers
to bad news being more timely reﬂected in earnings than good news.
3Tax-free reserves or ‘special items with an equity element’ are used for instance for realized
capital gains on assets which are left to the company to purchase new assets in the near
future. They are charged against income when created and treated as income when they
are released. This special item can also be used for excessive depreciations, which have
to be included in the commercial accounts and thus reduce commercial income in order
for them to be tax deductible, but when reported as a ‘special item with equity element’
the depreciated asset can be represented in the balance sheet with its ‘real commercial
book value’. Companies are however not obliged to report tax induced higher depreciations
this way. According to a 1987 study, less than one-quarter of the German companies actu-
ally do so (Haller, 1992).
4First time applications of IFRS could not have its full effect yet or result in substantial changes
in thecomputationsofearningscausinghigh abnormalaccrualsthat wouldincorrectly beattrib-
uted to earnings management.
5Average adjusted R
2 is 30% and ranges from 0.2 to 77%.
6While most earnings management studies assume earnings are managed for opportunistic
reasons, the exercised discretion can also be used to signal private information and thus
reduce information asymmetry (e.g. Subramanyam, 1996). However, because accounting
systems likely underreact to economic shocks, using accruals to signal ﬁrm performance
results on average in a less negative (and in speciﬁc cases even positive) correlation with
cash ﬂows (Leuz et al., 2003).
7This variable appears to be highly signiﬁcant in the IFRS model (p , 0.01).
8Non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon Mann–Whitney test) yield the same result regarding the dis-
cretionary accruals but indicate a signiﬁcant (p ¼ 0.046 two-tailed) difference between the
average total reported income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals.
9Non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon Mann–Whitney test) revealed qualitatively similar results.
10As mentioned earlier, these hidden reserves can be created by recognizing excessive deprecia-
tion of assets, building up unjustiﬁed provisions or setting aside certain proﬁts in tax-free
reserves. Depreciation is already accounted for in our previous accruals measure. After inves-
tigating some individual ﬁnancial statements, it appeared that certain provisions were some-
times classiﬁed as other liabilities. Due to data limitations, all of the tax-free reserves or
‘Sonderposten mit ru ¨cklageanteil’ could not be ﬁltered out because they were included in a
larger category, comprising other reserves.
11Firms that were listed on the German New Market had to report under either IFRS or US GAAP.
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